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In his classic article, The Structure of Standing,1 William Fletcher 
undertook nothing less than a fundamental revision of the Supreme Court’s 
standing doctrine. He proposed “that we abandon the attempt to capture the 
question of who should be able to enforce legal rights in a single formula, 
abandon the idea that standing is a preliminary jurisdictional issue, and 
abandon the idea that Article III requires a showing of ‘injury in fact.’”2 
With this doctrinal detritus cleared away, he argued,  
standing should simply be a question on the merits of plaintiff’s 
claim. If a duty is statutory, Congress should have essentially 
unlimited power to define the class of persons entitled to enforce 
that duty . . . . If a duty is constitutional, the constitutional clause 
 
* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay is being prepared for a symposium in 
honor of Judge (and Professor) William Fletcher and entitled “The Structure of Standing at 25.” I am 
grateful to Heather Elliott and the University of Alabama Law School for the invitation to participate, 
and to Athul Acharya for valuable research assistance. Judge Fletcher is the first person who ever 
encouraged me to go into law teaching, and it is both a pleasure and an honor to pay tribute to him and 
to engage with his classic article. 
1. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988). Because I am a 
sometime admiralty scholar, my heart will always belong first and foremost to Judge Fletcher’s 
immortal The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of 
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984) (really—just read it). But The Structure of Standing 
certainly occupies an exalted place in the Fletcher pantheon. 
2. Fletcher, Standing, supra note 1, at 223.  
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should be seen not only as the source of the duty, but also as the 
primary description of those entitled to enforce it.3  
Although “Congress should have some, but not unlimited, power to grant 
standing to enforce constitutional rights,” he insisted that “[t]he nature and 
extent of that power should vary depending on the duty and constitutional 
clause in question.”4 
For Judge Fletcher, “[t]he essence of a true standing question is the 
following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right to judicial enforcement of 
an asserted legal duty?”5 And his central insight was that “[t]his question 
should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable by reference to 
the statutory or constitutional provision whose protection is invoked.”6 
There is more, of course, to the article. For example, Fletcher attacked the 
very notion of “injury in fact” that serves as the keystone of the Supreme 
Court’s current standing doctrine.7 But the task I am setting for myself here 
is not a general defense of standing doctrine, and I submit that the core 
insight of Fletcher’s article—that standing is unintelligible apart from the 
merits of the underlying claims in a lawsuit—retains its significance even if 
one takes much of the edifice of contemporary standing doctrine as given. 
It is that central insight that I wish to examine in this Essay. 
Judge Fletcher’s central insight would be plainly correct even if we 
accept the injury-in-fact requirement. Injuries are always suffered with 
respect to some interest, and the relevant interests are typically related to, if 
not created by, the substantive rule of law that gives rise to the underlying 
claim. If I sue to challenge the state’s prohibition on flag burning,8 my 
injury is simply that I cannot exercise my right to free expression. What 
counts as an injury to the free speech interest is a merits question under the 
First Amendment. The substantive contours of the relevant rights matter. 
Despite the Court’s general refusal to recognize taxpayer standing,9 for 
example, the Court does recognize taxpayer standing to challenge the 
expenditure of public funds to support religious activities.10 The history of 
the Establishment Clause, which was born in reaction to government 
expenditures of taxpayer funds to support the Anglican clergy, supports 
 
3. Id. at 223–24 (footnote omitted). 
4. Id. at 224. 
5. Id. at 229. 
6. Id. 
7. See id. at 229–34. 
8. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down Texas’s ban on flag burning 
on First Amendment grounds). 
9. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
10. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
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taxpayer standing in a way that the background and core concerns of other 
constitutional provisions may not.11 
The same thing is true in statutory cases. Standing is often predicated 
on injuries to traditional, common law interests such as property rights, but 
even there an important (if often undisputed) predicate to standing is the 
substantive question of how far those rights extend. More pertinent to 
current debates, however, is the fact that federal statutes often themselves 
create rights, injuries to which can support standing. In Federal Election 
Commission v. Akins,12 for example, the Court allowed a group of voters to 
challenge a determination by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) that 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not covered 
by the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA). The Court upheld the FECA’s broad citizen-suit provision on the 
ground that the statute itself conferred a broad right on all voters to 
information about the activities of organizations like AIPAC. The FEC’s 
failure to require disclosure, the Court reasoned, had injured that statutorily 
created interest.13 The Court’s analysis largely vindicated Judge Fletcher’s 
point that plaintiffs’ standing cannot be divorced from the underlying 
substance of their claims. 
I want to suggest, however, that standing can never be solely a merits 
question that varies completely according to the particular statute or 
constitutional provision under which the plaintiff sues. I want, in other 
words, to praise not only Judge Fletcher’s central insight but also the notion 
of at least some general rules about standing. We still need such rules, I 
submit, for at least three reasons. The first, largely practical difficulty is 
that the inquiry that Fletcher urged for standing analysis, which was largely 
identical to asking whether the underlying statutory or constitutional 
provision created a private right of action, cannot do the work that Fletcher 
needs it to do. The remaining problems go deeper. The second is that, even 
in statutory cases, legislative intent about which plaintiffs ought to be 
permitted to sue will generally be fictional. Congress will not have 
addressed the problem, and the courts will need to rely largely on default 
presumptions. Those presumptions will necessarily end up looking like, 
well, general standing rules. And they will be even more necessary in 
constitutional cases, where the relevant intentions will be even more 
obscure. Finally, I believe that general values are at stake in debates about 
standing alongside the specific policies and purposes embodied in the law 
 
11. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 121 (6th ed. 
2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (suggesting that the distinction between Frothingham and Flast 
may be best explained by Judge Fletcher’s theory). 
12. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
13. See id. at 21. 
9 YOUNG 473-499 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2013 3:05 PM 
476 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:2:473 
underlying the particular lawsuit. Those values, which include separation of 
powers, federalism, and the need to protect the quality of judicial decision-
making, require certain general rules for their vindication. Fortunately, I 
believe those rules can coexist alongside a more forthright recognition of 
the importance of the underlying substantive claims in standing cases. 
The final section of this brief Essay extends Judge Fletcher’s central 
insight in two ways suggested by the Court’s recent decisions in the same-
sex marriage cases. The first extension has to do with standing based on 
interests created by state law, such as the right to defend a state initiative 
that California confers on the initiative’s proponents. The Court rejected 
that sort of interest in Hollingsworth v. Perry,14 but Fletcher’s approach 
helps to demonstrate why it reached the wrong result. If Fletcher is right 
that standing is critically a function of the underlying law, then when that 
underlying law is state law, state-created interests should generally suffice 
to create standing in federal court. My second point derives from the fact 
that both Hollingsworth and its companion case United States v. Windsor15 
involved standing to defend federal action—not to attack it. In such cases it 
becomes difficult to say that standing should be entirely a function of the 
underlying right asserted by the plaintiff; such cases support my more 
general thesis that standing doctrine still requires some general rules. 
Fletcher’s analysis still has something valuable to teach us in this context, 
however, for it reminds us that standing cannot focus exclusively on Article 
III. Different instances of standing to defend government actions will raise 
distinct substantive concerns—in particular, concerns about separation of 
powers involving not only the judiciary but also the relation between the 
political branches. (They may also, as in Hollingsworth, raise concerns 
about federalism.) Those concerns have an appropriate place in resolving 
this difficult set of standing questions. 
I. STANDING AND PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
If we concede that standing is a question on the merits, we still need to 
know how that question is to be answered. Judge Fletcher says that “[t]he 
essence of a true standing question” is “[d]oes the plaintiff have a legal 
right to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty?”16 That sounds 
identical to the question whether the plaintiff has a “right of action,”17 and 
 
14. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
15. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
16. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 229. 
17. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (considering whether private plaintiffs had a right to sue 
under a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 
677 (1979) (considering whether unsuccessful applicants for admission to a university could sue for 
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in fact Fletcher repeatedly invokes the Court’s private right of action cases 
as raising a “parallel” question.18 The virtue of the private right of action 
cases from Fletcher’s perspective, however, is that they are explicitly 
directed to the merits, turning on the interpretation of Congress’s intent 
with respect to enforcement of the particular statutory scheme in question. 
Hence, the Cort v. Ash test—still generally applied, albeit more strictly 
than heretofore—considers the following four factors: 
1. “[I]s the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted’—that is, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff?” 
2. “[I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or 
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?” 
3. “[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?” and 
4. “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally regulated to state law, 
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would 
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law?”19 
Fletcher’s discussion suggests that something like the same inquiry 
should be employed whenever Congress has not expressly conferred 
standing on a particular class of plaintiffs. 
I have two misgivings about this sort of inquiry. The first has to do 
with what has happened to the Cort test, especially in cases decided since 
Judge Fletcher wrote. According to the Hart & Wechsler authors, 
implication of private rights of action reached its “high water mark” as 
early as J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,20 decided in 1964, and since the 1979 
decision in Cannon, the Court “has generally rejected claims of implied 
federal remedies.”21 The leading contemporary case, Alexander v. 
Sandoval,22 is widely read to mean that the Court will virtually never 
recognize an implied right of action under federal statutes.23 In particular, 
 
discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). See generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 332–36 (discussing the private right of action cases). 
18. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 236. 
19. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 
U.S. 33, 39 (1916)). 
20. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
21. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 705–06. 
22. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
23. I have a pet theory that suggests Sandoval might be more a case about administrative law and 
the powers of agencies than an effort categorically to cut off implied private rights of action. Sandoval 
involved a claim of disparate impact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
Court had read that statute to forbid only purposeful discrimination, but an implementing regulation 
promulgated by the Department of Justice extended that prohibition to disparate impact discrimination. 
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Sandoval inferred Congress’s intent not to provide a private right of action 
from the fact that it had expressly provided for alternate enforcement 
methods.24 But those enforcement methods nearly always exist; public 
enforcement by the agency administering the relevant statute, for example, 
will almost always be available.25 If this move in Sandoval is to be taken 
seriously, then, the courts will end up recognizing very few implied private 
rights of action indeed. 
The Court’s tightening up of the Cort test and corresponding reluctance 
to infer private rights has some potentially important implications for Judge 
Fletcher’s proposal. Most obviously, it means that the implied right of 
action jurisprudence no longer stands ready, if it ever did, to serve as a 
more substantive alternative to the standing tests that Fletcher decries. If 
the requirements for standing were applied as strictly as Cort is these days 
(especially after Sandoval), then precious few plaintiffs will satisfy them. 
Nor would it be easy to construct an alternative, but equally merits-based 
framework. After all, Cort asks the questions one would expect to ask 
under Fletcher’s merits-based conception of standing: Did Congress intend, 
explicitly or implicitly, to empower private enforcement? Would such 
enforcement undermine or further the statutory scheme?26 If we collapse 
standing into whether Congress meant to permit private lawsuits, then one 
would think that the standing and private rights inquiries would have to 
dovetail. The result, given current doctrine on the latter question, would 
either be a much stricter standing doctrine—which no one seems to want—
 
In effect, the plaintiffs were claiming an implied right of action under the regulation, not the statute. 
One might thus read the case as primarily holding that agencies themselves cannot create private rights 
of action; the relevant intent is always Congress’s. In support of this reading, I would point out that the 
Court decided three other important cases the same term reining in the powers of administrative 
agencies. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting an opportunity to 
revive the classic nondelegation doctrine but invalidating—for the first time—an agency regulation as 
“unreasonable” under the second step of Chevron); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (held that an agency rule that pushed the limits of Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause wasn’t authorized by Congress with sufficient clarity); United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218 (2001) (refusing to extend Chevron deference to a large class of informal agency 
interpretations of statutes). Even if we can explain Sandoval in this way, however, it is fair to say that 
the Court has not been eager to recognize private rights of action in recent years. 
24. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289–90; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 708 
(discussing this aspect of Sandoval). 
25. Both Cannon and Sandoval involved conditional spending statutes, where the substantive 
legal obligations at issue applied to all recipients of federal funds, and the federal administering 
agencies retained authority to cut off those funds if recipients did not comply with the conditions. This 
is an even more attenuated form of alternative enforcement than agency enforcement suits, so 
Sandoval’s conclusion that it was enough to displace an implied private remedy is highly significant. 
26. We can probably do without the fourth prong of Cort, which asks whether the right in 
question falls in an area that is traditionally reserved to the states. That idea smacks of the old “dual 
federalism” doctrine, which purported to divide the world into separate and exclusive spheres of state 
regulatory authority. That doctrine collapsed after 1937, as it became extremely difficult to define and 
police the boundaries between such spheres. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence 
of Dual Federalism, 55 NOMOS (forthcoming 2014). 
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or, perhaps, a radical reconsideration of the private rights jurisprudence. 
The former seems more likely than the latter. 
It seems likely that the reason the implied private right jurisprudence 
has gotten so restrictive is that such rights have come to be viewed as a 
form of federal common law.27 As such, they are presumptively illegitimate 
under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,28 which announced that “[e]xcept in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the 
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state . . . . There is no federal 
general common law.”29 Erie has been read as a general rejection of 
judicial lawmaking,30 and this separation-of-powers principle casts doubt 
on federal courts’ freedom to create private remedies in the absence of 
statutory authorization. To be sure, the question “who can enforce a federal 
statute?” is plausibly “governed . . . by acts of Congress,”31 and the federal 
courts’ power to fill in remedial gaps in federal statutes has always struck 
me as the least problematic aspect of federal common law. One need only 
look to the extensive line of recent cases limiting Bivens’s implied right of 
action against federal officers for constitutional violations,32 however, to 
see the bad odor of judicial lawmaking that attends implied private rights 
and the effect that odor has had on the scope of those rights. 
Standing doctrine as it is currently conceived certainly has problems of 
its own—as Judge Fletcher well documents.33 But it largely escapes the 
particular calumny of judicial lawmaking that plagues the implied private 
rights jurisprudence. If anything, the charge of judicial legislation with 
respect to standing doctrine goes to the Court’s willingness to fashion 
 
27. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 690–742 (placing implied private rights in 
the chapter on federal common law). 
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
29. Id. at 78. 
30. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1682, 1685 (1974); see also Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst 
Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 151 (2011) (complaining that “Erie has been drafted into 
service in the war against judicial ‘activism’”). But see Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (to whom apologies are owed for my 
title here). Some critics have denied that Erie rests on a separation-of-powers rationale, see, e.g., Craig 
Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 615–33 (2008), but I find that reading wildly 
unpersuasive. See Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J. L., 
ECON. & POL. 17 (forthcoming 2014). 
31. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
32. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (recognizing an implied right of action under the Constitution itself to seek damages for 
constitutional violations by federal officers). For cases limiting Bivens, see, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412 (1988); Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Wilkie v. Robbins, 
551 U.S. 537 (2007). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 736–40 (discussing this line 
of decisions). 
33. See also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 463–64 (2008) 
(arguing that “standing is ill-suited to most of the functions it is asked to serve, and that forcing 
standing into this variety of roles contributes to the scathing critiques leveled against the doctrine.”). 
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principles limiting access to the federal courts. My concern is that by 
making standing more substantive or merits based, concerns about judicial 
lawmaking will increase, and they will run in the opposite direction. That 
is, what will seem legislative is the recognition of a plaintiff’s right to sue, 
whenever Congress has not explicitly recognized that right. That is 
certainly what has happened with implied private rights, and it is thus 
unclear that we should try to take standing to the same place. 
That is not to say that Judge Fletcher’s thesis will not have some 
important and considerably less controversial applications. So far I have 
been talking about implied private rights of action, but sometimes Congress 
expressly confers a right to sue on private plaintiffs. Presumably, Judge 
Fletcher would say that such plaintiffs always, or nearly always, have 
standing. That rule would certainly make cases like Federal Election 
Commission v. Akins,34 in which Congress had enacted a broad citizen-suit 
provision, considerably easier and more predictable for all concerned. 
Nonetheless, it seems likely there will be very many cases in which the 
necessary congressional intent will have to be implied, which will raise the 
concerns I have noted. It will also, as I discuss next, create a pressing need 
for default rules. 
II. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR DEFAULT RULES 
Judge Fletcher seems clearly right to argue that standing cannot be 
divorced from the underlying law at issue in a lawsuit. Indeed, I argue in 
Part III that the relevant underlying law extends even further than Fletcher 
suggests; it is not simply the law invoked by the plaintiff, but also 
potentially the institutional framework in which the parties operate. 
Nonetheless, standing also raises certain general questions that still require 
general answers. First, even if we confine our attention to Congress’s intent 
in enacting the substantive law invoked by the plaintiffs, courts will 
frequently lack the information concerning that intent that Fletcher’s 
analysis requires. We will need, as he acknowledges, default rules to fall 
back upon—and those default rules, I submit, will look a lot like the 
general standing principles that he criticizes. Second, standing also 
implicates certain general values and concerns about the role and 
competence of courts in our legal system. General principles reflecting 
those values have their place—not as an exclusive focus, as current law 
sometimes suggests—but alongside the more particularized inquiry that 
Fletcher prescribes. 
 
34. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
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A. Legislative Intent 
The thing about Congress is that it leaves stuff out. Many of the most 
interesting and pressing questions in public law arise in circumstances 
where Congress could have acted, but has not.35 In Erie, Congress could 
have enacted a statute about a railroad’s duty to pedestrians but did not;36 in 
most preemption cases, Congress may preempt as much state law as it likes 
but has not clearly stated its intentions; in many administrative law cases, 
Congress could have given more specific instructions to the agency but 
failed to do so. This is why there are so very many implied private right of 
action cases: Congress frequently fails to address who can sue under the 
statutes it enacts. 
This basic reality poses a problem for Judge Fletcher’s suggestion that 
standing should generally be a question of Congress’s intent with regard to 
the statute under which the plaintiff sues.37 In many cases, Congress will 
simply not have considered—or simply failed to reach closure on—the 
question who can sue to enforce a particular statutory scheme. The text 
may not address the question, and relevant legislative history may be 
unreliable, ambiguous, or nonexistent. In many statutory construction 
contexts, these sorts of gaps and ambiguities are handled through default 
rules. It seems likely that, in a Fletcheresque standing world, courts would 
very quickly be forced to develop such rules to handle the many cases in 
which the underlying merits of the plaintiffs claim do not readily address 
the standing question. The application of such default rules might well turn 
on things like: How concrete was the plaintiff’s injury? How direct is the 
line of causation between the challenged conduct and the plaintiff’s injury? 
Is the plaintiff asserting her own rights or those of a third party? The 
problem, of course, should be obvious: a set of default rules like this would 
like an awful lot like the set of general, non-merits-based standing rules 
that Fletcher decries. 
It is not clear how much Judge Fletcher would disagree with the 
continuing need for default rules. He acknowledges that “[i]n many cases, 
the relevant statute may be silent or unclear on the question of who should 
have standing,” and he allows as how, “[i]n such cases, the Court may 
 
35. For example, the preface to the first edition of the Hart and Wechsler casebook asserted that  
[f]or every case in which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal 
legislative authority, there are many more in which the allocation of control does not involve 
questions of ultimate power; Congress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the 
normal state-created norms, leaving courts to face the problem as an issue of choice of law. 
Quoted in HART & WEHCSLER, supra note 11, at vi. 
36. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 30, at 1684 n.10. 
37. The likelihood of ambiguity seems even greater when the plaintiff’s claim rests upon the 
Constitution rather than a statute. 
9 YOUNG 473-499 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2013 3:05 PM 
482 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:2:473 
properly invoke background assumptions about the functions of judicial 
review in certain areas, and about traditional categories of recognized 
injuries and permissible plaintiffs in those areas.”38 “[S]tanding questions,” 
he says, “need not be seen as coming into the world naked and newborn 
with each new statute.”39 Fletcher thus recognizes that “[t]he ideas that the 
Court now invokes as controlling principles of standing law . . . are useful 
as presumptions or aids for construction. . . .”40 He insists, however, that 
“they can never be more than presumptions,” and that “[t]he actual 
provision at issue must be the controlling authority, for the merits of a 
standing claim must always depend, in the end, on the meaning of the 
statute or constitutional clause upon which the plaintiff relies.”41 
Our disagreement, then, is plainly one of degree or relative emphasis. 
But I fear that it may be a relatively large disagreement despite being of 
that mild character.42 I expect that the statute-specific evidence of 
Congress’s intent will very frequently fail to answer the question of who is 
entitled to sue under that statute, forcing courts to fall back on the available 
default rules. If that is right, then “the actual provision at issue” will hardly 
be “the controlling authority,” because the default rules will be doing most 
of the work in most of the cases. And even if it has addressed the private 
right of action question, Congress is unlikely to have anticipated the variety 
of persons who might wish to bring suit under a given statute; some 
plaintiffs might clearly have standing, in other words, but the standing of 
others might remain highly ambiguous. 
Consider a variant on the facts of Warth v. Seldin,43 for example. Warth 
was an exclusionary zoning case in which the plaintiffs argued that the 
town of Penfield, a ritzy suburb of Rochester, New York, had enacted 
various ordinances that made it virtually impossible to find low-income 
housing. The actual plaintiff’s claims were constitutional, but let us 
imagine that they instead sued under a federal statute prohibiting 
exclusionary zoning. We might plausibly seek to determine, using the 
standard tools of implied right of action analysis, whether Congress 
intended to create a private right of action under the statute. But how would 
that analysis cope with the wide range of plaintiffs in Warth? They 
included low income individuals who had failed to find housing in 
Penfield, residents of nearby Rochester who alleged they had to pay higher 
taxes to support the social services needed by would-be Penfielders who 
 
38. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 265. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 239. 
41. Id. 
42. “I fear” is the right locution, because another default presumption I employ is that when 
Judge Fletcher and I disagree, I am probably the one who is wrong. 
43. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
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were forced to live in Rochester instead, well-meaning residents of Penfield 
who felt deprived of the benefits of living in a more racially and 
economically diverse community, and a variety of membership 
organizations, including housing advocacy groups and organizations of for-
profit homebuilders. Perhaps a general analysis of the text and purposes of 
our hypothetical anti-exclusionary zoning law might lead us to conclude 
with some confidence that Congress did, in fact, intend to provide for 
private enforcement suits under the statute. But that sort of conclusion will 
often tell us very little about precisely who can sue. It seems very likely 
that even if Congress clearly meant to cover some of the Warth plaintiffs, 
its intent as to others would be highly ambiguous at best. 
None of this is to criticize Judge Fletcher for emphasizing the 
importance of the underlying merits as part of any standing inquiry. That 
insight is a useful corrective to the current doctrine’s rhetoric, which tends 
to treat standing as wholly divorced from any merits questions (even if, in 
practice, that divide is not always rigorously respected). My point is simply 
that general standing rules are still going to have to do a fair amount of 
work. In the remainder of this Essay, I argue that this is a good thing. 
B. Standing’s Own Values 
Although Judge Fletcher has eloquently explained why the underlying 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim should matter in standing cases, he has not 
demonstrated why they are the only thing that matters. I want to suggest 
that standing doctrine serves certain general sets of values, and that 
vindication of those values requires at least some general rules. I highlight 
three sets of values here: separation of powers, federalism, and the 
functional requisites of effective adjudication. 
The Court often speaks of “the foundational role that Article III 
standing plays in our separation of powers.”44 Justice Powell warned, for 
example, that “[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related to 
the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing 
unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the 
allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a 
democratic form of government.”45 
This sort of reasoning can be traced all the way back to Marbury v. 
Madison,46 which viewed an injury to “the rights of individuals” as a 
predicate to judicial action.47 Marbury’s argument for the power of judicial 
 
44. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1443 (2011). 
45. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
47. Id. at 163 
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review is best grounded in the Court’s obligation to decide the case before 
it, an enterprise which necessarily required the resolution of the conflict 
between a statute purporting to confer jurisdiction on the Court and a 
constitutional provision seeming to foreclose that jurisdiction.48 If that is 
right, then the awesome power of judicial review49 is cabined first and 
foremost by the boundaries of the case that brings the constitutional 
question before the Court in the first place. 
Other separation-of-powers arguments for standing can be made.50 The 
important point, however, is that the force of such arguments is typically 
not a function of congressional intent with respect to the substantive law 
that forms the basis of the plaintiff’s suit. To the extent that such general 
considerations undergird standing doctrine, those considerations ought to 
be brought to bear through general standing principles. Some separation-of-
powers aspects of standing may act to constrain Congress rather than the 
courts; for example, limits on private-party standing limit Congress’s 
ability to circumvent its ordinary dependence on the Executive branch to 
enforce its laws. In such contexts, making Congress the arbiter of standing 
would put the fox in charge of the henhouse. But the more basic point is 
that Congress will not always be mindful of the broad constitutional values 
associated with standing when it enacts particular statutes, so if those 
values are to be consistently respected it will need to be done through 
general rules. 
Federalism is less commonly invoked than separation of powers in 
standing debates, but it remains relevant nonetheless. In Richardson, 
Justice Powell warned of “the contradictions that would arise if a 
democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected branches of 
government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial 
branch.”51 When the elected branches being overseen are state 
governments, broad standing thus raises a question of federalism. Congress 
may choose, for example, to expand its regulatory leverage vis-à-vis the 
states by enlisting private attorneys general to enforce federal law, thereby 
avoiding some of the resource constraints that otherwise limit federal 
executive action.52 Similarly, standing doctrine regulates the extent that 
 
48. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 72 (“Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
Marbury treats the law declaration power as incidental to the resolution of a concrete dispute 
occasioned by Marbury’s claim to a ‘private right’ to take possession of the office.”). 
49. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (asserting that the Court is supreme in the 
exposition of the Constitution). 
50. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
51. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
52. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) 
(considering whether private qui tam suits on behalf of the United States could be brought against state 
governments under the False Claims Act); Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, & Ernest A. Young, 
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state and local governments will be subject to federal judicial review under 
individual rights provisions of the Constitution.53 And general standing 
rules have also empowered state governments to bring suit in their own 
right to vindicate their own vision of the public interest under federal law.54 
In all these instances, the standing inquiry should ask not only whether the 
underlying statute or constitutional provision confers a right to sue on the 
plaintiff, but also whether more general values of state autonomy deserve 
protection as well. 
The contributions by Andrew Hessick and Heather Elliott to this 
Symposium illustrate the complex interplay of standing and federalism. 
Professor Hessick notes that “[r]ecognizing standing to be a form of 
substantive law means that state law should control standing in federal 
court,” at least where the plaintiff’s claim turns on state law.55 Professor 
Elliott refocuses attention on Judge Fletcher’s earlier article about standing 
in state court, in which Fletcher argued that state courts should apply 
federal justiciability standards when hearing federal claims.56 Hessick’s 
proposal relies explicitly on the rule, derived from Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,57 that state substantive law governs the adjudication of state law 
claims in diversity cases.58 Likewise, Fletcher’s argument is analogous to 
the “reverse-Erie” principle that state courts hearing federal claims must 
apply those aspects of federal law that are bound up with the substance of 
the federal claim.59 
Both arguments seem unassailable if we assume that standing is 
entirely a function of the underlying substantive law that forms the basis of 
the plaintiff’s claim. But they each require qualification to the extent that 
standing may also reflect more general values. Some of those values relate 
directly to the forum and apply regardless of the source of the underlying 
law. Judicial judgments about the sort of controversies that a court can 
 
State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And 
How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1121 (2001) (considering the resource constraints that limit 
actions against states by the executive and the extent to which Congress can employ private attorneys 
general in this setting). 
53. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
54. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (according “special solicitude” to the 
states as plaintiffs as part of its standing analysis). 
55. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REV. 417, 418 (2013). 
56. Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 437–42 (2013) (discussing 
William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal 
Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 282 (1990). Professor Elliott does not conclusively endorse 
Fletcher’s prescription, but rather uses it to shed light on yet another problem of federalism and 
standing raised by the Court’s recent decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). I 
discuss that problem in Part III, infra. 
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
58. See Hessick, supra note 55, at 418. 
59. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 422–29. 
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effectively decide, for example, presumptively pertain to all cases in 
federal court, regardless of whether they rest on state or federal law.60 And 
structural values of separation of powers and federalism may not simply 
disappear when a federal court entertains a state claim (or vice versa). For 
example, state standing rules may be calibrated to the unique characteristics 
of state courts, which are often accountable to state electorates in a way 
that federal diversity courts are not. A federal court’s adoption of state 
standing rules broader than the federal norm might thus undermine the 
checks and balances existing at the state level. Imposition of federal 
standing rules on state courts hearing federal claims, on the other hand, 
may complicate the adjudication of cases involving both federal and state 
claims and create pressure for state courts to conform their justiciability 
doctrines to federal norms. 
I do not mean to suggest that Professor Hessick or Judge Fletcher’s 
proposals should be rejected. My point is simply that if we understand 
standing to rest both on substantive characteristics of the plaintiff’s claim 
and on more general values, then courts in Erie and reverse-Erie situations 
will have to try and unpack these considerations. I doubt that will be 
impossible to do; the answer may turn out to be simply that the basic 
question of what counts as an “injury” turns on the law that creates the 
underlying claim, but that certain prudential rules will apply to all cases in 
the particular forum. But some such hybrid account will be necessary if the 
doctrine is to account for all the relevant concerns. 
Finally, standing doctrine often expresses concern for what Richard 
Fallon has called “the functional requisites of effective adjudication.”61 
These requisites include a concrete factual setting and zealous adversary 
presentation on both the facts and the law. The first contributes to the 
distinctively retrospective quality of judicial decisionmaking: by insisting 
that the plaintiff already be injured by the defendant’s conduct, courts are 
assured of a look at the relevant law in action within a concrete setting. 
Rather than speculating as legislators might about the effects of new 
legislation, judges can provide a “sober second thought” once the law is 
applied in practice.62 The second requisite, adversary presentation, is 
necessary to ensure the court access to the most important facts and 
 
60. Another way of putting this point would be to say that arguments about the concrete factual 
settings, adversary presentation, and the like are procedural in character, but I was taught long ago to be 
nervous about drawing any sharp line between substance and procedure. 
61. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the 
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51 (1984); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, 
at 75. 
62. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (1962). 
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arguments, and it is at least arguably best assured when the plaintiff’s ox 
has actually been gored.  
To be sure, standing doctrine does not always ensure the most effective 
presentation of issues to courts. As Justice Scalia has noted, “Often the 
very best adversaries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the 
American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract 
question at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever”; 
nonetheless, as he points out, “the doctrine of standing clearly excludes 
them, unless they can attach themselves to some particular individual who 
happens to have some personal interest (however minor) at stake.”63 But 
this form of “attachment” is typically easy; in the classic case of Sierra 
Club v. Morton,64 for example, no one disputed that the Sierra Club could 
readily have identified a particular member who had visited the public 
lands at the center of the litigation and thus manifested the requisite 
concrete injury in fact.65 Standing doctrine thus hardly prevents the 
participation of interest groups, but the required presence of a directly-
affected litigant will tend to focus the court’s inquiry and render it less 
legislative in character.66 
Much of standing doctrine is organized around this need to ensure that 
questions are teed up for courts in a form best suited for judicial resolution. 
It is hardly obvious that these general concerns evaporate once we 
recognize that other important considerations are specific to the underlying 
merits of each plaintiff’s claim. Like the other general values of federalism 
and separation of powers, then, the functional requisites of adjudication 
require attention to considerations that transcend the merits of the particular 
plaintiff’s claim. 
C. Should Standing Be Discarded? 
In claiming that standing questions implicate certain general sets of 
value alongside the particular values associated with plaintiffs’ underlying 
claims, I am not necessarily claiming that current standing doctrine actually 
 
63. Scalia, supra note 50, at 891–92. 
64. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
65. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 56, at 446 (characterizing the Morton rule as “not particularly 
hard to follow”). 
66. In support of this point, the Morton majority quoted Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that 
 by leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the 
law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the 
daily aggressions of party spirit. The errors of the legislator are exposed only to meet a real 
want; and it is always a positive and appreciable fact that must serve as the basis of a 
prosecution.  
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (Philips Bradley, ed., 1945) (quoted in 
Morton, 405 U.S. at 740 n.16).  
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vindicates those values in an optimal way. A number of smart people have 
argued that it does not.67 My point is simply to say that these general values 
of separation of powers, federalism, and the functional requisites of 
effective adjudication are all relevant to standing, and that standing 
doctrine ought to be constructed with these values in mind. That can surely 
be done without ignoring—as the current cases sometimes purport to do—
the underlying merits of a plaintiff’s claims. But taking stock of general 
values will most likely require at least a limited set of general rules that 
supplement the more particularistic inquiry that Judge Fletcher advocates. 
And if we can go that far, then I wonder how different that world would 
actually look from current doctrine. 
Moreover, it seems to me that the widely prescribed flight from general 
standing principles is unlikely to solve any problems that currently exist in 
the doctrine. As the preceding discussion illustrates, Judge Fletcher’s 
forthright directive to focus on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims is 
unlikely to free us of the need for general standing rules. The same can be 
said of other proposals, such as Heather Elliott’s suggestion that “[i]nstead 
of using a constitutional doctrine so plainly flawed, [the Court] should 
develop a vibrant abstention doctrine that permits it to pursue separation-
of-powers goals without the obfuscation caused by standing doctrine.”68 
Far be it from me to prefer “flawed” doctrines to “vibrant” ones, although I 
will admit to a certain affection for “obfuscation.” But I fear that an 
approach relying on abstention or something like it would take us out of the 
frying pan and into the fire. 
As Professor Elliott sensibly acknowledges, “[a]bandoning this sort of 
threshold inquiry altogether seems unwise; while the current doctrine is 
faulty, the separation-of-powers functions it serves should not be 
abandoned.”69 The primary advantage of an abstention inquiry, I take it, is 
that it allows “the federal courts to explicitly raise the separation-of-powers 
concerns [undergirding standing] but as a matter of prudence rather than 
constitutional mandate.”70 I doubt, however, that the problem with current 
doctrine is that it is too inflexible. Critics frequently argue that the Court 
can manipulate standing to hear cases that it doesn’t wish to hear71 or to 
 
67. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 33. 
68. Id. at 464. As Professor Elliott notes, “abstention has been proposed as an alternative to 
standing since at least Professor Jaffe’s time.” Id. at 464 n.19 (citing Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure 
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961)). 
69. Id. at 508. 
70. Id. at 510. It is not clear, however, that abstention doctrine itself is best viewed as purely 
prudential. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power 
of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811 (arguing that abstention is, in fact, constitutional law). 
71. Scholars have debated whether this is a bug or a feature. Compare, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961), with 
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pour out plaintiffs it doesn’t like.72 There are many cases in which the 
Court does find sufficient flexibility to pay attention to factors like 
Congress’s intent in conferring a right to sue73 or specific separation-of-
powers considerations arising from the requested relief.74 And if the 
doctrine is too inflexible, it is hard to see how that inflexibility can be laid 
at the door of the constitutional text. Article III’s “case or controversy” 
language, after all, leaves all the interesting questions to be answered by 
judicial elaboration. 
It is hard to see how untethering the doctrine altogether would make it 
more determinate or less controversial. Abstention doctrine in its natural 
habitat, after all, is widely criticized on all the same grounds that plague 
standing doctrine—being indeterminate, being manipulable, and failing to 
serve its underlying values.75 Moreover, the traditional abstention doctrines 
are grounded rather firmly in the courts’ equitable discretion not to grant 
injunctive or declaratory relief.76 No comparable hook exists upon which to 
hang a much broader abstention doctrine meant to cover all the purposes 
currently served by standing. But the primary point is that the problems in 
standing doctrine arise not from the fact that we call it “standing” rather 
than “abstention,” or that we ground it in Article III rather than prudential 
discretion. Standing doctrine arouses criticism because the questions it 
necessarily confronts—who has the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, and under what circumstances?—are simply hard questions. 
But they are inevitable questions. Whatever we call it, standing doctrine is 
going to be hard. 
III. STANDING TO DEFEND GOVERNMENT ACTION 
This last Part extends both Judge Fletcher’s analysis and my own to a 
difficult set of standing problems that took on particular salience in last 
Term’s same-sex marriage cases. Hollingsworth v. Perry involved 
California’s Proposition 8, an amendment to the state constitution barring 
recognition of same-sex marriage, while United States v. Windsor was a 
challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines 
marriage for all purposes of federal law as only existing between a man and 
 
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency 
in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
72. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that human rights 
lawyers, journalists, and activists lacked standing to challenge a government surveillance program). 
73. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 12 (1998). 
74. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
75. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
1191 (1977). 
76. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996). 
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a woman. In both cases, the relevant executive branch authorities—
California’s governor and attorney general in Hollingsworth, the President 
and the U.S. Attorney General in Windsor—declined to defend the 
challenged enactments on the ground that they believed the laws to be 
unconstitutional. Both cases, however, featured other parties—the 
proponents of the Proposition 8 initiative and the House of 
Representative’s “Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group” (BLAG), 
respectively—who sought to defend the enactments in the executive 
branch’s absence. And Windsor featured the additional wrinkle that the 
Department of Justice appealed the case to the Supreme Court 
notwithstanding that its preferred view—that DOMA was 
unconstitutional—had prevailed in the Second Circuit. The result looked 
like a Federal Courts exam run amok. 
I argue that the standing-to-defend conundrum illustrates both the 
virtues of Judge Fletcher’s central insight and the continuing need for some 
general standing principles. I first explore the relevance of state law to 
Article III standing in Hollingsworth, then consider the federal separation-
of-powers problems raised by the Obama administration’s decision not to 
defend DOMA in Windsor. 
A. Hollingsworth and the Power of State Law to Create Standing 
Proposition 8, a ballot initiative passed in 2008, added a provision to 
the California state constitution stating that “[o]nly marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”77 When Kristin 
Perry and her partner Sandra Stier filed suit to challenge the state’s refusal 
to issue them a marriage license, there was no doubt that they had standing 
to challenge that action or Proposition 8 itself. The relevant state officials 
declined to defend the law in court,78 however, and the federal district 
judge allowed the official proponents of the ballot initiative, 
ProtectMarriage.com (led by then-Senator Dennis Hollingsworth) to 
intervene in the suit and defend the law. When the plaintiffs prevailed in 
the district court, the state officials declined to appeal—thus raising the 
question whether the intervenors had standing to pursue the appeal on their 
own.79 
 
77. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
78. The State did, however, continue to enforce the law throughout the litigation. See 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013). I suggest in Section B, below, that enforcing but 
not defending is a highly questionable practice. 
79. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (holding that intervenors can pursue an appeal 
on their own if they satisfy the requirements for Article III standing in their own right). 
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The Ninth Circuit viewed that question as turning on the nature of the 
interest that state law confers on initiative proponents. In response to a 
certified question, the California Supreme Court determined that  
[i]n a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, 
the official proponents of the initiative are authorized under 
California law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the 
measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.80  
That was good enough for the federal court of appeals, but the Supreme 
Court reversed, emphasizing that “standing in federal court is a question of 
federal law, not state law.”81 The majority discounted the California 
Supreme Court’s holding that Hollingsworth’s organization could act on 
the state’s behalf. “[N]o matter its reasons,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
“the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek 
relief for a generalized grievance cannot override our settled law to the 
contrary.”82 
Judge Fletcher’s view strongly suggests that standing should remain 
largely a function of the underlying substantive law, even where that law is 
the law of a state.83 Although Article III standing is a question of federal 
law at the end of the day, standing often rests on interests created by state 
law. If the federal government takes my property, for example, my standing 
to sue for compensation arises from the property rights created by state law. 
If a private plaintiff sues a federal official in tort, the Federal Tort Claims 
Act adopts state substantive law as the rule of decision,84 and Fletcher 
would presumably analyze the plaintiff’s standing largely in terms of 
whether the underlying state tort law confers a right to sue on that 
particular litigant.  
Nor is it incongruous to look to state law in determining standing to 
defend a state law: for example, if a dispute had arisen between the 
governor’s office and the Alameda County Clerk-Registrar (also a 
defendant in the case) about which official had standing to appeal the 
decision (or not), presumably that question would have been governed by 
state law. And on all these questions—like any other question of state 
 
80. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011). 
81. 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
82. Id. 
83. That conclusion is strongly implied, for instance, by his view that federal standing law should 
govern federal claims brought in state court. See Fletcher, supra note 56. 
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
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law—the federal courts owe conclusive deference to the California 
Supreme Court’s authority “to say what the law is.”85 
At the same time, the Court has long recognized that Article III 
requires different and often stricter standing requirements than many state 
constitutions.86 As the Chief Justice pointed out, federal standing principles 
“serv[e] vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of 
separated powers.”87 As I have already suggested, those interests are to 
some extent general, not particular to the underlying substantive law in 
individual lawsuits. Hence, Article III doctrine should constrain states from 
“issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the 
federal courthouse.”88 Analogous federal constraints exist even in areas of 
unquestioned state primacy. Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 
for example, state law generally defines the property and liberty interests 
that trigger federal protection, but at the outer limits federal law requires 
recognition of certain property and liberty interests and cuts off federal 
cognizance of others.89 
This need for some federal outer limit on the state interests that may 
create Article III standing made Hollingsworth a difficult case—at least in 
principle. The majority erred, however, to the extent that it simply 
federalized the question of who could represent California’s interest in the 
case.90 In the takings and due process contexts, federal law imposes a floor 
and a ceiling on the property and liberty interests that trigger federal 
protection, but within these outer bounds state law retains its primary and 
ordinarily dispositive role.91 
Some degree of federal flexibility is necessary, moreover, to allow state 
law to deal with its own separation-of-powers problem—that is, how to 
prevent state officials from subverting the popular initiative process by 
 
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“This Court . . . repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of 
state law . . . and that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present 
here.”) (citing, inter alia, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)). 
86. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam); Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
87. Hollingsworth, 133 S.h Ct. at 2667. 
88. Id. 
89. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding that the 
Takings Clause required recognition of certain interests as property notwithstanding contrary state law); 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (refusing to recognize a state-created liberty interest as 
sufficient to trigger Due Process protections). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000). 
90. See 133 S. Ct. at 2666–67 (holding that “the most basic features of an agency relationship are 
missing here” based on the Restatement (Third) of Agency). 
91. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 486–90. 
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simply refusing to defend the laws that process produces.92 As Justice 
Kennedy pointed out in dissent, “[g]iving the Governor and attorney 
general this de facto veto will erode one of the cornerstones of the State’s 
governmental structure.”93 I argue in Section B below that Article III rules 
in standing-to-defend cases should be informed not only by general 
concerns about judicial competence and restraint but also by the particular 
separation-of-powers concerns arising when executive officials decline to 
defend federal legislation. In Hollingsworth, those same concerns should 
have supported deference to the underlying state law. Rather than creating 
a federal rule of state separation of powers prohibiting delegation of the 
state’s interest in defending state laws, the Court should have respected the 
state’s determination so long as it did not radically expand the class of 
parties entitled to invoke federal jurisdiction.94 
As a final note, the standing problem in Hollingsworth may well have 
implications beyond the context of popular initiatives. Controversies over 
same-sex marriage have highlighted a broader phenomenon of state 
executive decisions not to defend controversial state laws.95 Whether state 
law confers an interest on other individuals and entities to step into such 
cases—outside the distinctive initiative process—will likely be murkier 
than in Hollingsworth. And the non-unitary nature of most state executive 
branches, which typically feature separate elections for governor, attorney 
general, and other executive positions, adds an additional complication. 
When those cases find their way into federal courts, those courts should be 
sensitive to the underlying state law principles rather than imposing some 
quasi-federal common-law notion of the requisite governmental interests. 
B. Windsor and the Relation Between Injury and Adversariness 
Windsor lacked the state-law wrinkle of Hollingsworth but nonetheless 
required the Court to unpack elements of the standing inquiry—injury and 
adversariness—that are typically bundled together. And, unlike in 
 
92. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1140 (Cal. 2011) (noting that the initiative’s “primary 
purpose . . . was to afford the people the ability to propose and to adopt constitutional amendments or 
statutory provisions that their elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt”). 
93. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. (noting that “in light 
of the frequency with which initiatives’ opponents resort to litigation, the impact of that veto could be 
substantial.”). 
94. See generally Elliott, supra note 56, at 451–54 (developing a similar criticism in more depth). 
95. See Juliet Eilperin, State Officials Balk at Defending Laws They Deem Unconstitutional, 
WASH. POST (July 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-officials-balk-at-defending-
laws-they-deem-unconstitutional/2013/07/18/14cf86ce-ee2b-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html 
(“[I]n a number of high-profile cases around the country, top state officials are balking at defending 
laws on gay marriage, immigration and other socially divisive issues—saying the statutes are 
unconstitutional and should not be enforced.”). 
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Hollingsworth, the broader separation-of-powers questions posed by the 
executive’s failure to defend DOMA were federal in nature. As in 
Hollingsworth, these questions illustrate both the importance and limits of 
Judge Fletcher’s substantive approach to standing. 
Take the limits first. The executive’s power to decline defense of a 
federal statute poses one of the most difficult conundrums in federal 
constitutional law. On the one hand, the President and his officers all take 
oaths to uphold the Constitution, and most observers seem to agree that at 
least in some circumstances, that responsibility may extend to declining to 
enforce or defend laws that the President believes to be unconstitutional. 
On the other, a President may decline to defend a statute simply because he 
doesn’t like it on policy or ideological grounds; as Rick Pildes has noted, 
“‘There’s always a very strong political temptation for elected officials— 
whether they’re attorneys general, governors or chief executives—not to 
defend laws they disagree with politically, or whose defense will alienate 
powerful political constituencies.’”96 Rolling over when a disfavored law is 
challenged offers a convenient way to end-run the political and institutional 
limitations of the President’s veto power. After all, one can decline to 
defend a statute enacted before the current President even took office; 
Congress cannot override this form of presidential disapproval; and at least 
sometimes the refusal to defend may have lower public visibility than an 
outright veto. It is, in other words, a pretty neat trick for getting rid of 
statutes that the President may disapprove. 
This separation-of-powers dilemma is generally not specific to 
particular federal statutes. While Justice Scalia did suggest in his Windsor 
dissent that executive decisions not to defend statutes encroaching on the 
President’s own powers were a different (and more legitimate) category,97 
such a rule would still apply to a whole category of cases. Questions of 
who has standing to defend a given law thus necessarily turn on a general 
set of institutional considerations rather than the intent of Congress in 
enacting the specific statute. Cases like Windsor thus demonstrate the 
continuing need for at least some more general rules of standing. 
That said, however, Windsor’s standing dilemma also demonstrates the 
worth of Judge Fletcher’s central insight that standing must reflect 
underlying substantive values in the case rather than being limited to 
wholly generic principles concerning, say, the parties’ injury or 
adversariness. For an earlier illustration, consider Allen v. Wright,98 in 
which private parties sued to enjoin the IRS to more aggressively enforce 
 
96. Quoted in id. Professor Pildes was talking about the temptations facing state officials, but it is 
hard to argue that the same temptations would not apply at the federal level. 
97. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2700 n.2 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
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laws barring tax-exempt status for private schools practicing racial 
segregation. Allen turned primarily on causation and redressability, but the 
Court’s analysis was informed by general separation-of-powers concerns 
for preserving the executive’s enforcement discretion. Traditional equitable 
principles drastically restricting injunction requiring government officials 
to enforce the law “transported into the Article III context,” the Court said, 
“that principle, grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, 
counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought . . . to seek a 
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill 
its legal duties.”99 The Court’s argument did not rely on a truly general 
standing principle, and the dissenters complained that any equitable 
considerations had no place in the standing analysis.100 But that, I take it, is 
Judge Fletcher’s point—that the merits should intrude on standing analysis. 
As Allen illustrates, those merits include not only the substance of the 
plaintiffs’ claim but also other factors, such as the case’s institutional 
setting. That is particularly true in standing-to-defend cases like 
Hollingsworth and Windsor. The separation-of-powers values at stake 
differ among standing to defend cases when, for example, a private third-
party beneficiary to a contract seeks to uphold a reading of a contract that 
the parties have abandoned, or when a public interest group seeks to defend 
an agency regulation interpreting a federal statute that the agency no longer 
wishes to pursue. How each of these contexts should play out is beyond the 
scope of this Essay. It is worth exploring the issue with respect to DOMA a 
bit further, however, to see how treating standing as a wholly separate 
question may undermine our ability to resolve the underlying separation-of-
powers conundrum. 
One limit on presidential abuse is the requirement, codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 530D, that the President report to Congress any decision not to 
enforce or defend a federal law. That requirement obliges the President to 
articulate a principled justification—a constitutional argument—for the 
decision. We saw the political limits of that constraint in the same-sex 
marriage cases this term, however. The Obama administration’s § 530D 
letter explaining why it would not defend the DOMA concluded broadly 
that “classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a 
heightened standard of scrutiny” and that excluding same-sex couples from 
 
99. Id. at 761. 
100. See, e.g., id. at 791 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fundamental aspect of standing is that it 
focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than on the 
issues he wishes to have adjudicated . . . . The strength of the plaintiff’s interest in the outcome has 
nothing to do with whether the relief it seeks would intrude upon the prerogatives of other branches of 
government . . . .”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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marriage could not meet that standard.101 The letter acknowledged that no 
court had yet applied heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual 
orientation. Worse, in Hollingsworth, the Administration asked the Court to 
decide only that state bans are unconstitutional in states that offer same-sex 
couples some form of recognition as domestic partners.102 At oral 
argument, the Solicitor General allowed that “we’re not prepared to close 
the door to an argument in another [s]tate” that same-sex marriage bans are 
constitutional.103 Given that federal law does not recognize domestic 
partnerships, it is hard to see how the argument against DOMA could have 
been so clear that the Administration could not even litigate the question. 
I do not mean to argue against the equal protection claims in Windsor 
and Hollingsworth.104 My point is simply that the executive should decline 
to defend a duly-enacted federal statute only when the argument against it 
is very clear, and the Obama administration’s behavior seriously 
undermined its initial contention that the case against DOMA met that 
standard. Moreover, the administration’s “eight-state solution”—a position 
rightly shelled by the justices at oral argument105 and largely without 
defenders in the academy—raised strong suspicions that the 
administration’s legal positions were being driven by political 
considerations.106 In any event, it seems plain that the § 530D process 
neither constrains the President’s future litigation options nor enforces any 
strong commitment to principled decisionmaking. 
From the standpoint of separation-of-powers law, the most promising 
check on executive decisions not to defend federal laws is to allow other 
persons to take up their defense. Permitting the BLAG or some other 
 
101. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Rep. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. H.R. 
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-22.html. 
102. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (“The Court can resolve this case by focusing on the 
particular circumstances presented by California law and the recognition it gives to committed same-sex 
relationships, rather than addressing the equal protection issue under circumstances not present here.”); 
see also Marcia Coyle, Government Presses Eight-State Solution for Gay Marriage and More, THE 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (March 1, 2013, 8:52 AM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/03/government-presses-8-state-solution-for-gay-marriage-and-
more.html. 
103. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144). 
104. I do think, as I argue elsewhere, that the Court was right to decide Windsor by injecting a 
heavy dose of federalism. See Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in 
United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (2013). 
105. See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, The Supreme Court was Highly Skeptical of Obama’s Weird Gay 
Marriage Argument, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/justices-dont-like-
eight-state-solution-2013-3 (reporting that “not one justice seemed to buy that argument when the high 
court was hearing arguments Wednesday on California’s gay marriage ban Proposition 8.”). 
106. Those considerations could have included the politics of the court itself, but may also have 
reflected a desire to avoid antagonizing the large majority of states that offer same-sex couples neither 
marriage nor domestic partnership status. 
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governmental institution to stand in for the Justice Department in cases like 
Windsor allows the President to keep faith with his own view of 
constitutional meaning while preventing that option from turning into a de 
facto veto. That reality demonstrates, however, how the “substantive” 
separation-of-powers question is intimately bound up with the question of 
standing. If only the executive branch has standing to defend the law, then 
we are left looking for other checks—with few promising candidates. 
The Windsor majority avoided the question of BLAG’s standing to 
defend DOMA by concluding that the executive branch, in effect, was 
holding up its half of the case or controversy by continuing to enforce the 
statute.107 After all, the suit was for a refund of estate taxes that the IRS had 
unconstitutionally required of Edith Windsor by refusing to recognize her 
marriage to her deceased partner, and that controversy remained active 
until the IRS paid up.108 The problem, as Justice Scalia pointed out,109 was 
that there was no live controversy between Windsor and the Government 
over the legal question of DOMA’s constitutionality. Both parties thus 
retained an injury—Windsor had not received her refund, and the IRS was 
under a court order to pay it out of the Treasury—but they lacked 
adversariness over the dispositive legal question in the suit. Ordinarily we 
trust in the injury-in-fact requirement to ensure adversariness, but Windsor 
was the rare case requiring the Court to disaggregate these two traditional 
components of standing. 
There is a strong argument that the Court should not have had to 
confront this difficult issue in Windsor—and, indeed, that the standing 
question should never come up in the form that it did in that case. The 
conflict between injury and adversariness arose because the Government 
continued to enforce the DOMA, even though it was unwilling to defend 
that statute in court. Either of the two possible consistent positions would 
have obviated the tension: if DOMA were neither enforced nor defended, 
then the case would have lacked both injury and adversariness.110 And of 
 
107. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686–87 (2013). 
108. The problem would have been presented in a more difficult form if, as in Hollingsworth, the 
Government had declined to appeal the Second Circuit’s ruling. In that posture, the Court would have 
had no choice to resolve whether BLAG would have standing to appeal in its own right. 
109. See 133 S. Ct. at 2699–700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
110. That approach by the Government might have eventually raised difficult questions of 
ripeness or mootness in cases where same-sex couples sought an injunction against enforcement of 
DOMA. Cases pending at the time such a decision was taken would arguably be moot, although the 
United States’ voluntary cessation of enforcement would probably not be sufficient to moot the case. 
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 11, at 189. Cases filed after the non-enforcement decision would arguably not be ripe, see, 
e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dismissing challenge to Connecticut’s contraceptive ban in 
the absence of any specific threat of enforcement), although plaintiffs might be able to argue a 
continuing stigmatic harm or that the possibility of future enforcement might undermine their ability to 
plan their long-term futures together, cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries 
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course if the Government defended what it was enforcing, we would have 
the usual case with no standing issue at all. Nor is the problem simply that 
the Government was being inconsistent. If the power to decline defense of 
a federal statute stems from the President’s obligation to uphold the 
Constitution, then how does enforcing the statute square with that 
obligation? It seems unwise to predicate basic rules of standing on a 
situation that arises only when the Government is arguably violating its 
legal—and ethical—obligations. 
In any event, I think Justice Kennedy’s position that BLAG’s 
participation supplied the requisite adversariness as a practical matter111 
derives added force from the need to balance the prerogatives of and 
constraints on Executive power as a matter of underlying separation-of-
powers law. This recognition does not necessarily make the adversariness 
element prudential, for instance in the sense that Congress could eliminate 
it by statute. The constitutional rules of separation of powers are also 
flexible and pragmatic, in the interests of maintaining a workable system of 
checks and balances.112 There is room, even as a constitutional matter, for 
standing rules that take into account the need to counterbalance executive 
prerogatives of non-defence and non-enforcement. The crucial point, as 
Judge Fletcher told us in his seminal article, is that the underlying concerns 
of the law in the case cannot be held apart from the rules of standing. 
CONCLUSION 
I have made no attempt here to develop a full-fledged theory of 
standing, and it seems likely that I have taken Judge Fletcher’s theory in 
directions that he might not endorse. That, however, is why we describe a 
work like The Structure of Standing as “seminal”—it furthers not only the 
author’s particular approach to its subject, but also influences the way that 
other participants in the field think about a question. I am not quite ready to 
give up on traditional standing doctrine, with its oft-repeated catchphrases 
like “injury in fact”; for one thing, I have taught that doctrine to too many 
people that might want a refund if I disavowed it now. And as a Federal 
Courts teacher, I have a lot invested in the notion that concepts like 
“standing” represent a common set of problems that should be addressed by 
generally applicable rules. But Fletcher’s central insight—that those 
generally applicable rules cannot be understood wholly apart from the 
 
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000) (arguing that even 
absent enforcement, sodomy laws injured gay persons). 
111. See 133 S. Ct. at 2687–88. 
112. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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underlying law at issue in particular cases—helps a very great deal to make 
sense of the way those general rules apply in hard cases. 
